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During this decade the structure of corporate finance in Japan has
changed dramatically. Japanese firms that once used bank debt as their prime
source of financing now rely more heavily on the public capital markets. This
trend was facilitated by the substantial deregulation of the Japanese capital
markets. In an earlier paper (Moshi, Kashyap. and Scharfstein 1988). we
demonstrated that investment by firms with close bank relationships appears to
be less liquidity constrained than investment by firms without close bank
ties. We interpreted this finding as evidence that bank ties tend to mitigate
information problems in the capital market. This paper tracks the investment
behavior of firms that have recently weakened their bank ties in favor of
greater reliance on the bond market. The results suggest that these firms are
now more liquidity constrained. The paper concludes with a discussion of why
firms would loosen their bank ties in light of these liquidity costs.
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Economists typically view banks as intermediaries that serve to
channel funds from individual investors to firms with productive
investment opportunities. This commonly held view, however, is difficult
to reconcile with the assumption of frictionless capital markets: in
frictionless markets, firms would raise capital directly from individual
investors and avoid the costs of intermediationJ
This paper offers empirical evidence on the benefits of
intermediation. Our explanation for the existence of financial
intermediaries derives from the view that there may be important
capital-market frictions created by information problems between firms
and investors. We view banks and other financial intermediaries as
institutions designed in part to circumvent these capital-market
imperfections. Specifically, banks serve as corporate monitors who pay
the costs of becoming informed about their client firms and who try to
ensure that the managers of these firms take efficient actions.
This view of the role of banks is not new. Schumpeter (1939) argued
informally along these lines and Diamond (1984) has constructed a formal
model that captures these and related ideas. Diamond shows that
delegatingthe task of monitoring to a financial intermediary minimizes
monitoring costs. The alternative --issuingsecurities like public debt
and equity -- maybe inefficient either because monitoring costs ate
needlessly duplicated among individual security holders, or because
monitoring is a public good which no one has an incentive to provide. Of
course, this raises a potentially troubling question: Who ensuresthat
banks monitor the firms in which they invest? Diamond shows that bank
diversification plays a key role in ensuring that banks indeed monitor
their client firms. His is the first model that takes full account of2
monitoring costs and shows that financial intermediation can be the most
efficient monitoring mechanism. Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984) and
Williamson (1986) make similar points.
Our goat in this paper is to analyze empirically the role of banks
in monitoring firms when there are information problems in the capital
market. The focus of our study is the Japanese economy where
historically banks have played a much more important role in financing
investment than in the U.S.2 However, in the past decade the importance
of bank financing in Japan has declined dramatically. While bank
borrowing comprised 84 percent of all external financing between 1971 and
1975, it was only 57 percent in the 1981-1985 period. In large part.
this resulted from considerable deregulation of Japanese capital markets
-- enablingfirms to raise capital directly from financial markets in the
form of bonds and other debt-linked instruments. The result has been a
substantial disintermediation of the Japanese financial system.
These regulatory changes offers us an excellent opportunity to
study the role of financial intermediation. Our research strategy is to
examine the investment behavior of a panel of firms before and after
deregulation. In the period before deregulation all of the firms in our
sample had close ties to a bank or set of banks. After deregulation,
some of these finns loosened their ties to banks and relied more heavily
on direct capital-market financing. Another set maintained their close
banking ties. Our goal is to see whether the investment behavior of
firms that have maintained their bank relationships exhibit the features
of a bank-monitored fin. Moreover, we wish to detect changes in the
investment behavior of firms that have loosened their bank ties: Do they3
exhibit behavior that reflects the fact that they were monitored before
deregulation, but not monitored after deregulation?
Of coursethecrucialstep in this analysis isidentifying
investmentbehavior that distinguishes between firms that are monitored
andthose that are not.Inthis regard we build on our earlier work in
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1988) which also examined the
relationship between liquidity and investment for firms with different
degrees of bank affiliation. We argued in that paperthat essentially
all models that posit some sort of information problem in the capital
market predict that liquidity should be positively related to investment.
This prediction arises, for example, in Myers and Majiuf (1984). In
theirmodel, managers are privately informed about the value of
investment.This means that equity will sometimes be underpriced.
Managers will therefore be reluctant to issue equity tofinance
investment: indeed, they may turn down positive net present value
investments that they would otherwise accept if they had the internal
funds to finance the investment. This model generates the prediction
that, all else equal, more liquid firms should invest more. Onecan
derivesimilar predictions from models that assume different information
asymmetries and moral-hazard problems.
Bankmonitoringis one way of overcoming these information
problems. If banks lend a large fraction of a firm's debt as well as'
ownaportion of its equity (as they do in Japan), then theyhave strong
incentives to become informed about the firmandits investment
opportunities. It is also in their interest to ensure that managersmake
efficient business decisions. In this case, the theory would predict
that there should be little relationship between investment and liquidity4
for bank monitored firms. If fins need funds to finance investment they
can go directly to their informed bank to raise the money. Provided the
project is valuable, the bank should be willing to provide the capital.
To explore these ideas, we start with a sample of firms all of
which had close bank ties before deregulation. Investment by these
firms is not sensitive to their liquidity during the 1977-1982 period.
We identify 1.983 as the first year in which the effects of deregulation
were fully felt. By that time, there is a set of firms that have
significantly reduced their bank borrowing and increased their direct
capital-market financing. These firms exhibit a strong sensitivity of
investment to cash flow in the later period, whereas their investment did
not depend on liquidity in the earlier period. By contrast, the firms
that maintained bank ties show no sensitivity of investment to cash flow
in both periods -- beforeand after deregulation.
These results complement our earlier work (Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein (1988)) which compared the investment behavior of this
sampleof firms to the investment behavior of fins without close
bankingtiesduringthe period 1977-1982. In that paper we found that
the investment of the latter set of firms was quite sensitive to
liquidity whereas it was not so for firms with close bank ties. The most
interesting aspect of this paper is that we explore the investment
behavior of the sa set of firms over different periods. In some
respects, it is more compelling to establish that, for the same firm,
liquidity is more important as it weakens its banking ties.
These results raise the natural question of why a firm would choose
to weaken its bank ties and incur this cost. Obviously, the answer must
be that there are compensating benefits from rasing funds directly fromS
the capital market or costs of maintaining bank ties. These costs and
benefits, while potentially important, are poorly understood and
difficult to quantify. The Conclusion includes some conjectures about
what these costs and benefits may be. The more limited goal of this
paper is to establish the facts about what happened toinvestment
behavior as a result of deregulation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next
section reviews the regulatory changes in Japan that have enabled firms
to issue directly placed securities. We trace the changes in aggregate
financing patterns between 1971 and 1985. We then present financing
statistics for the firms in our panel. These results are consistent with
the aggregate changes. Section 3 presents our main empirical evidence.
In that section we also entertain other explanations for our findings.
Finally. Section 4 contains concluding remarks. It also includes some
speculative comments about the factors that might explain why some firms
have shifted to direct financing and others have not.
2.Deregulation andChanges in JapaneseCorporate Finance
Untilrecently bank debt was the predominant form of financing for
Japanese firms. In large part this was due to regulations that made it
difficult or even impossible to raise funds directly from securities
markets. During the early 1980s a series of regulatory reforms were
implemented that increased significantly the financing options of
Japanese corporations. The result has been a dramatic transformation in
the structure of Japanese corporate finance. This section reviews those
regulatory reforms and presents aggregate- and micro-level evidence on
their impact on financing patterns.6
The Japanese government's security-market regulations reduced both
the supply and demand for corporate debt. First, on the supply side, the
government required all domestically issued bonds to be fully secured
against a fin's assets. It is widely believed that Japanese managers
were reluctant to issue secured debt. The Nihon Keizai Shimbun-sha
(1987) cites the administrative cost of establishing collateral as one
the most important reasons for the stagnant growth of domestic straight
bond issues. There were no prohibitions against unsecured bank debt.
According to Yoshihara (1987, p. 130), as of March 1981, less than 40
percent of all lending done by banks required collateral. These
regulations therefore encourage bank financing.
A second supply-side regulation required firms to receive
government permission to issue bonds in foreign markets. Unlike
domestic bonds, these bonds could be unsecured. Nevertheless, foreign
bonds were infrequently used because the government -- fora complicated
set of reasons --appearsto have been reluctant to grant permission to
issue these bonds.
Finally -- andperhaps most importantly -- therewere interest-rate
ceilings that reduced the demand for bonds. Holders of corporate bonds
thus earned below-market yields. For example, Shimura (1978) reports
that the difference between the subscribers' yield and the market yield
of corporate bonds was as high as one percentage point in the late L960s.
While there were also interest rate ceilings on bank debt, it is widely
believed that banks were able to get around these restrictions by
requiring firms to hold non-interest bearing accounts at the bank. (See,
for example, Aoki (1984), pp. 20-21.)7
Theresult, as one would expect, is that bank borrowing was the
primary source of external funds for most firms. Nasu (1987) reports
that from 1976-1980, 80 percent of manufacturing firms external funds
came through borrowing from financial institutions.
The move towards deregulation was initiated in the government bond
market. Until 1977, there was essentially no secondary market for
government bonds. Instead, the Ministry of Finance put pressure onthe
banks to hold these low-yielding bonds. During a time in which
government debt was quite low, this was acceptable tothe banks. High
growth helped sustain such practices because the Bank of Japan could (and
actually did) monetize the bonds without fear of inflationary
consequences. But as the government deficit grew and growthslowed after
the first oil shock, this policy became more costly to the banks. They
began to put pressure on the government to loosen its interest-rate
restrictions. The government finally agreed to do so and by June 1978
the Ministry of Finance began selling bonds through public auctions.
Relaxation of interest rate-ceilings in the corporate bond market soon
followedas it became apparent that the demand for corporate bonds would
have been destroyed by the liberalization of the government bond market.
Asevidence of this change, the mean difference between the subscribers'
yield and the market yield in the 1980-1988 period was -54 basis points,
whereas it was 32 basis points between 1973 and 1979. Interest-rate
ceilings still exist, but they are adjusted frequently in line with
market conditions) In addition, the interest rates on convertible bonds
are not regulated (Shinkai, p. 288).8
The government's second major reform was the loosening of its
restrictions on foreign bond issues. Following the passage of the
Foreign Exchange Law Reform of 1960, firms were no longer required to
have government permission before issuing bonds on overseas markets;
insteadtheywereonlyrequiredto notify the government thatthey
intendedto make such an issue.4 According to the Ministry of Finance.
by 1983 Japanese firms raised almost half their capital in overseas
securities markets.
A third importantreform was thegovernment's legalizationof
warrantbondsin June,1981.Thesebandscome with an option to buy
shares at a specified price during a certain period. This option was
initially non-detachable, but became detachable after December 1985. The
Ministry of Finance reports that by 1986 over 20 percent of all new funds
were raised using warrant bonds.
Finally, in January 1983 the government phased in new regulations
allowing firms to issue non-collateralized bonds. Before then, only
Toyota Motors and Matsushita Electric were permitted to issue unsecured
bonds in domestic securities markets. In January 1983, an additional
ninefirms were permitted to issue unsecuredstraightdebt and 23 more
firms were allowed unsecured convertible bonds. In several stages over
the subsequent four years. these privileges were gradually expanded; by
February1987, 180 firmscould issue unsecured straight bonds and 330
firmscould issue unsecured domestic convertible bonds.
Together these reforms facilitated a pronounced shift in the
aggregate financing patterns away from (indirect) bank borrowing and
towards (direct) bond financing. Table 2.1 reproduces Nasu's (1987)
statistics on financing patterns since 1971. As the table shows, between9
1981 and 1985. the aggregate percentage of external funds raised by bank
borrowing was 57 percent, which was down from 80 percent in the preceding
five-year period. In contrast, the percentage due to bond financing rose
from 2 percent between 1976 and 1980 to 22 percent between 1981 and 1985.
The percentage of external funds raised through equity issues also
increased slightly from 12 percent between 1976 and 1980, to 16 percent
between 1981 and 1985.
The remainder of this section examines whether these general
patterns also hold for a particular set of manufacturing firms. The
firms in question represent a subset of the Japanese manufacturing firms
that have been continuously listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange since
1965. (Since the data are described at length in Hoshi, icashyap and
Scharfstein (1988), we omit an extended description of the data.5) This
particular subset comprises 121 non-financial firms that we previously
classified as having a close affiliation to a single bank in the 1972-
1982 period. The question we ask is whether these firms that already had
well-established banking relationships have followed the general movement
away from bank borrowing. In the next section, we examine whether any
such moves have affected their investment behavior.
To address this first question, we supplemented the balance sheet
data that we have previously used with detailed data on borrowing
patterns. These data are available from the publication Keiretsu no
Kenkvu,whichis also one of the original sources underlying the
identification of these firms as having a strong bank relationship from
1972 to 1982. Ourstrategyin collecting the data was to pick two years
that would permit a comparison of the borrowing patterns before and after
the reforms discussed above. We chose 1977 as the early year for two10
reasons:it is well before any of the important regulatory changes and it
is the first year for which we had the stock price data needed to compute
Tobin's q (which we need later in analyzing investment). We compare the
corporate financing patterns in 1977 to those in 1986, the most recent
year for which data areavailable.6 While post-1986 data would be
helpful, it is not necessary; by then many of the key regulatory changes
that havcenabled fins to reduce their dependence on bank financing were
already in place.
In collecting the data we found that 12 of the 121. firms either did
not have complete data in Keiretsu no Kenkvu, or had switched largest
lenders by 1986. These firms no longer satisfy our definition of a firm
with a close bank relationship. For the remaining 109 firms, Table 2.2
compares data on some key variables in 1977 and 1986.
Thefirst observation is that for these firms the ten years between
1977 and 1986 have been ones of steady growth. The real capital stock
increasedby 50 percent over this period. Judging from the recent data,
the growth of the capital stock appears to be continuing: in 1977, the
median value of Tobin's q was 1.32, while the median rate of investment
(relative to the capital stock) was .07; in 1986. these numbers were 1.68
and .19, respectively.7'8 Thus, the period we are analyzing is one in
which there was considerable investment, and financing needs were likely
to have been important.
The change in the debt-equity ratio during this period is perhaps
the most striking piece of evidence from Table 2.2; in 1977, the ratio
was 1.26; by 1986 it had fallen to .37. These numbers primarily reflect
the steep rise in the Japanese stock market. During this ten year period
the aggregate equity value of these fins rose by more than fourfold, an1.1
annualgrowth rate of over 15 percent. While equity values have soared,
there has been a much smaller increase in debt financing; the median
nominal market value of debt rose only three percent, amounting to a real
decline of about 11 percent.
The aggregate shift away from bank borrowing towards bond financing
that was mentioned earlier is also evident for these fins. Table 2.2
shows that the book value of bank borrowing has fallen in real terms,
with the median value falling by 24 percent and the mean falling by 11
percent. In addition, long-term bank borrowing was a much smaller
fraction of all long-ten liabilities, falling from 66 percent in 1977
percent to 31. percent in 1986.
One historically important source of bank financing are banks
affiliated with a firm's keiretsu or industrial group. These groups are
loose affiliations of fins (many of which have trading relationships
with each other) centered around a core group of banks and other
financial intermediaries. The 109 firms in our sample can all be
considered members of one of the six largest industrial groups during the
1972-1982 period. It is widely believed that for these firms group
financing was the most important source of capital.9
Thereare a number of important differences between borrowing from a
group bank and borrowing from other banks. First, group banks arelikely
tohold more debt in these firms than other banks and hence have stronger
incentives to monitor them. In 1977, in our sample, group banks held on
average 24 percent of all bank debt. In addition, group banksalso tend
to hold more equity in their client firms; this too gives them more
powerful incentives to monitor. Moreover, group banks have in the past
been active at helping member fins in financial distress; other banks12
often defer to the group banks, expecting them to take the lead in
organizing any financial workouts for distressed firms (Sheard (1985)).
Finally. former bank executives are often placed in top managerial
positions at these fins. This may facilitate the flow of information
the bank and its client firms.
Table 2.2 reveals that firms have become much less dependent on
group financial institutions for their financing. The book value of
borrowing from group financial institutions has dropped substantially,
with the median falling 33 percent in real terms and the mean 4 percent.
Interestingly, this change has mirrored changes in the amount of total
bank borrowing. As the table shows, while the overall level of group
borrowing has fallen, as a fraction of total bank borrowing this form of
borrowing has remained roughly constant.
So far we have focused on the changes in the level of bank and
group borrowing, Of course, these changes could in principle reflect a
decline in the financing needs of Japanese corporations. To give us a
more meaningful measure of the change in the composition of financing, we
control for the change in firms' financing needs by normalizing the
borrowing numbers by the market value of the firms' debt and by the
market value of their depreciable assets)0
These ratios reinforce the view that both bank and group borrowing
have become less important funding sources. Relative to total debt, both
types of borrowing show modest declines- -by five percent in terms of all
bank borrowing and by 21 percent in terms of group borrowing. However,
these declines come on top of the previously mentioned downward trend in
debt financing, so that they understate the movement away from bank
financing. For this reason, the ratios that compare the borrowing13
numbers to the capital stock are better measures of these level effects;
relative to the capital stock both borrowing measures fell by over 40
percent from 1977 to 1986.
Table 2.2 also indicates that along with the shift away from bank
financing there has been a move towards bond financing. The median book
value of bond financing rose by over three and a half times in real
terms. As a fraction of long-term liabilities, bonds have risen twofold.
A more detailed look at the bond patterns reveals that most of the
increase in bond financing has come from the issue of convertible bonds.
In 1977 the average amount of outstanding convertible bonds accounted for
30 percent of all bond financing. This percentage and the amount of
outstanding convertible bonds were both roughly constant until the 1983
regulatory changes. Since then, convertible bonds have gained in use, so
that by 1986 their face value was nearly five times the level in 1977.
Even with the rise in straight bond financing. CBs accounted for 60 of
all bond financing in 1986.
A simple pattern emerges from Table 2.2. The period of steady
growth from 1977 to 1986 accompanied a marked decline in debt-equity
ratios. In particular, the bank borrowing component of debt, the
traditional source of financing, became much less important. This is
reflected in declines in borrowing from both group banks and other banks.
The recent data suggest that when fins need outside financing they are
increasingly turning to the stock market and the newly developed bond
market.
While this message is consistent with the aggregate evidence
presented earlier, it is somewhat misleading; Table 2.2 masks some
interesting heterogeneity in the data. Not all of the firms have been so14
aggressive in cutting back on debt financing, nor have all the firms had
such steady growth. In fact, the performance and general financing
patterns of firms that have reduced their dependence on bank financing
are quite different than firms that have maintained their banking
relationships.
Table 2.3 demonstrates this point by separately showing the
relevant statistics from Table 2.2 for two sets of fins: those for whom
the ratio of group borrowing to total debt has decreased and those for
whom it has increased. The same basic pattern would emerge if we
classified these firms according to changes in the ratio of total bank
borrowing to debt.
This table brings out two important points.
have reduced their dependence on group financing
more generally) have had much higher growth than
increased their dependence on group financing.
stock of the median firm in the former set of
size in 1977 -- areal growth rate of over six
contrast, the real capital stock of the median
its group borrowing has risen by less than one
The second important difference between the two sets of firms is
their changes in q. Despite the large increase of the capital stock for
the firms that have become less dependent on group financing, their q's
have risen appreciably. The increase in q for these firms is roughly
twice as large as for the other fins.
These data suggest that decisions regarding the mix of debt
financing are not arbitrary; Diamond (1989) presents a theory of this
choice. This raises an important issue for our paper when we come to
First, the firms that
(and bank financing,
the finns that have
In 1986, the real capital
firms is over twice its
percent a year. In
firm that has increased
percent per year.1115
compare the investment behavior ofthe two sets of finns: Are the factors
that determine firms financing choices correlated in some way withtheir
investment behavior? If so, our results will be biased. After
discussing what we think determines fins financing choices, we argue




The objective of this section is to investigate whether the
documented changes in Japanese financing patterns have had an impact on
corporateinvestment behavior. M discussed in the Introduction,
essentially all models that posit information problems in the capital
market predict that more liquid firms undertake more investment. We have
argued that close bank relationships are a means of mitigating
information problems; banks with large debt and equity stakes in firms
have strong incentives to monitor them. In contrast, firms without
investors who have large financial stakes at risk are more likely to face
information problems when it comes to raising capital.
In Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1988) we showed that duringthe
period when these firms all had close banking relationships,1977-1982,
liquidity was not a significant determinant of investment. The question
we ask here is whether for the set of firms that have loosenedtheir ties
to banks, liquidity is a more important determinant of investment.
Moreover, does liquidity continue to be unimportant for firms that
maintain close bank ties?16
The main empirical obstacle in determining the importance of
liquidity is the possibility that liquidity is correlated withother
variables that affect investment. In particular, if the fundamental
determinantsof investment are unobservable, then the liquidity
coefficient in an investment regression will be biased to extent that
liquidityis correlated with the fundamentals. The standard claim is the
such correlation exists: strong current performance as evidenced by high
liquidity signals that future performance is likely to be goodand hence
that investment is worthwhile. Thus, a regression of investment on some
measure of liquidity may simply be picking up the relationshipbetween
current and future performance, inducing an omitted variable bias.
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) take two steps towards
addresking this problem. First, they estimate an equation that contains
both liquidity and an explicit proxy for the value of investment
opportunities. They argue that since q is a forward looking measure of
profitability, it is useful in this regard. We believe that q is an
imperfect measure of investment opportunities12 so that some component of
liquidity still reflects these opportunities. Nevertheless, to the
extent that q does reflect investment opportunities it will reduce the
omitted variable bias of the liquidity coefficient.
The more innovative approach to this problem is to compare the
effects of liquidity across two sets of firms. Fazzari, Hubbard, and
Petersen identify a set of firm that they believe on a orion grounds are
likely to face information problems in the capital market and identify
another set that are not likely to face such problems.13 They then
estimate the investment equations for these two sets of firms, comparing
the estimated effects of liquidity. Under the null hypothesis of perfect17
capital markets there should be no difference in the estimated liquidity
coefficients provided the omitted variable bias is the same for the two
sets of firms. Thus, if one is to explain the finding that liquidity is
more important for one set of firms under the null hypothesis, one has
to argue that the omitted variable bias is greater for that set of firms:
either that q is a particularly bad proxy for investment or that
liquidity is particularly good proxy. Below, we discuss two arguments
along these lines, but do not find compelling evidence for them. Absent
such a compelling argument, the findings are consistent with the
existence of liquidity constraints.
3.2Regression Equations
Theevidence we will present is obtained by regressing
investment in depreciable assets (normalized by the stock of depreciable
assets)on a set of yearly dummies, a tax-corrected version of q for
depreciable assets, cash flow, lagged production and the beginning of
period stock of marketable securities. The last three variables were all
normalized by the stock of depreciable assets and all the data were first
differenced.
Thisregression equation is the same as the one estimated in our
previouspaper. Essentially all of the non-liquidity variables are
included to reduce the possibility that the liquidity variables might be
proxying for unobservable determinants of investment. We briefly discuss
why these variables should reduce this possibility. The yearly dummies
are included to filter out any common macroeconomicshocksJ4 Other firm
or industry-specific shocks are eliminated by first differencing (at the
cost of losing one year of data). Since this transformation induces a
moving-average ten into the residual, all the standard errors reported18
below are computed using a robust method that allows for first-order
moving average errors (see White (1984)).
For the reasons given above we include q in the regressions. In
fact, we actually use both beginning- and end-of-period q in all of our
regressions. We include both measures because it is possible that cash
received during the period contains information about investment
opportunities not contained in the beginning-of-period q.Including the
end-of-period q addresses this problem at the cost of obscuring the
interpretation of the coefficients on Since these regressions are
not designed to test the q theory of investment, this trade-oil is one we
are willing to make. The results are not affected by the inclusion of
end-of-period q.
We also include production over the previous year in our
regressions. There are several reasons to include production. The most
important is that the empirical investment literature has repeatedly
shown the existence of an accelerator effect in the data.Ourprevious
paper confirms the importance of the effect for these firms. Blundell et
al. (1988), Fazzari et al. (1988) and Whited (1988) establish that the
accelerator effect is important even in models with q for firms in
Britain and the U.S. -Ifwe were to drop production, it is possible that
the liquidity variable would be proxying for accelerator effects since
production and liquidity are typically correlated. The inclusion of both
variables eliminates this problem. In addition, theoretical arguments
based on the presence of monopolistic competition in the product market
can also be used to justify the inclusion of a production term in the
investment equation (see Schiantarelli and Georgoutous (1987)). We19
emphasize, however, that these results do not depend on the inclusion of
production.
Finally, since the focus of the investigation is the sensitivity of
investment to liquidity, we include twomeasuresof liquidity. The first
variable is current cash flow which is defined as income after taxplus
depreciation less dividend payments.16 We also include the firms
holding of marketable securities as a proxy for the stock of afirms
liquid assets. These securities are identified by the firms as assets
that can readily be converted into cash. In most years, the median
firm's holdings of these cash-equivalents is as large as the median
atuount of investment.
3.3 Findings
Asa starting point for our discussion, we estimate the basic
regression for the 109 firms over the 1.978-1982 period -- specifically,
from April 1978 to March 1983. The results are shown in the first column
of Table 3.1. As would be expected from our previous work, neither cash
flow nor the stock of liquidity is a significant determinant of
investment over this pre-deregulation period. The coefficients of both
variables are precisely estimated and small, which suggests the
interpretation that these variables are not important determinants of
investment.
As the second column of the table shows, the results are less clear-
cut over the 1983-1986 period. The point estimate of the cash-flow
coefficient is much larger, but it is imprecisely estimated so that at
conventional levels of significance it is indistinguishable from zero.
The seemingly large standard errors suggest that there is substantial
heterogeneity in the data. Below, we establish that this is the case.20
It is worth pointing out that, as so much previous work has shown, q
does not appear to be the key variable that determines investment. Also,
production is no longer significant in the later period. Given the
reduced-form nature of the regression, this change is hard to interpret.
We now consider the natural question raised by the results in Table
3.1: Is the increased sensitivity of investment to cash-flow in the later
period related to the changes in financing patterns that occurred at the
same time? To address this question, we separated the sample into two
sets of firms, those that increased and those that decreased their
reliance on bank financing. As a measure of the strength of a bank
relationship we used the ratio of group borrowing to debt. We focus on
group borrowing rather than total bank borrowing because, as discussed
above, group borrowing is probably associated with more intensive
monitoring. However, it is worth indicating that other measures of the
dependence on bank financing yield similar results.
We ran the above regressions for the two sets of firms. The first
two columns of Table 3.2 show that for the pre-deregulation period, the
sensitivity of investment to internal funds does not seem to depend on
whether or not firms subsequently changed their group borrowing to total
debt ratio. Put differently, splitting the sample in the 1978 to 1982
period does not reveal a tendency for either class of firms to invest
more when their liquidity is higher.
Since the two samples are independent, hypothesis tests comparing
individual coefficients between the two sets of firms can be conducted
without being concerned about covariances. As the table shows, the
sampling variation is large enough so that none of the individual
coefficients are statistically different for the two groups. In most21
cases, the coefficients are also precisely estimated so that such
comparisons are meaningful. The only exception is for the marketable
securities variable, where the coefficient is very difficult to pin down
for the firms that have maintained strong ties to the groups. Overall,
these findings support our previous work: during this period when all of
these firms had close banking ties, liquidity does not drive investment.
The third column of Table 3.2 demonstrates the first of the two main
findings of the paper: firms that have loosened their ties to group banks
exhibited a marked increase in the effect of liquidity on investment. The
coefficient on cash flow for these firms increased by a factor of five
from .082 to .479 between the pre- and post- deregulation periods; the t-
statistic on cash flow increased from .8 to 3.4. Using a one-sided test,
the post-deregulation coefficient is significantly larger than the pre-
deregulation coefficient at the 5 percent level. The other coefficients
for these firms are mostly unaffected; none are statistically different
across the two periods.
The paper's second major result, shown in the last column of the
table, is that for firms that have maintained their ties to group banks,
liquidity continues to be unimportant even after deregulation. For these
fins, both before and after the regulatory changes, cash flow is
statistically insignificant with a coefficient that is tightly estimated
and close to zero. The effect of holdings of marketable securities is
hard to pin down in either period, but neither coefficient is
significant. Individual comparisons of the other variables in the
equation also suggest that there are no statistically significant.
differences across the two periods, although the standard errors on
coefficients for beginning-of-period q are rather large.22
The analysis suggests that bank relationships rel.ax liquidity
constraints. Before accepting this interpretation of the evidence,
however, we explore an alternative explanation of our results.As we
discussed above, the characteristics of firms that have loosened their
bank ties differ substantially from those that do not. In particular,
firms that reduced their dependence on banks had higher growth and higher
q's. This suggests that there are some underlying economic forces that
determine corporate borrowing patterns. Diamond (1989) and Hoshi.
Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1989) analyze models along this line. It is
possible that the factors that determine this choice are correlated with
firms' investment behavior.
One explanation for the result that liquidity is unimportant for
firms that maintain their bank ties is based on the observation that
these firms generally have low q. These firms would not be expected to
invest heavily and their investment opportunities are probably poor. It
might be argued that for these firms neither liquidity nor any other
variable should forecast investment. In contrast, successful firms with
high q tend to use the public capital markets. These firms have better
investment opportunities and one might expect that other variables like
liquidity would predict investment. Hence, in this view, the omitted
variable bias is more severe for the firms that have loosened their bank
tiesand it is not surprising that the estimated effects of liquidity are
larger for these fins.By thisreasoning, any selection mechanism that
simultaneouslypartitions finns on the basis of q implicitly uncovers an
investment-liquiditylinkage that is driven by these consideration rather
than the selection rule.23
To address this alternative explanation, one mustshowthat a
selection rule that explicitly conditions on performance does not explain
the observed differences in the relationship between investment and
liquidity.Table 3.3 reports the estimated regression equationsafter
sorting firms into low and high q groups. The partition is made on the
basis of average q for all assets in 1977.17 To save space, we only
report results for the partition that separates the top one third and
bottom two-thirds of the firms: thisamountsto separating firms with q
above and below 1.5. similar results would apply for a partition based
on the median firm. It also does not matter whether we partition based
on q in 1977 or in 1986.
The table suggests that our main findings are not explained by the
possibility that cash flow contains differential information for high and
lowq firms. The first two columns show that for both sets of firms,
liquiditywas unimportant in thepre-deregulation period; both the flow
andstock measures of liquidity are tightly estimated and insignificant.
The last two columns show that similar -- althoughsomewhat ambiguous -.
resultshold for the post-deregulation period. Over this period, cash
flow is harder to estimate precisely with relatively high standard
errors. None of the coefficients is significant. The coefficients for
the low and high q firms are not significantly different from each other,
although the point estimate for the low q firm is higher. We also
sorted simultaneously by both q and the ratio of group borrowing to
debt. Both low and high q firms that reduced their group borrowing showed
a strong sensitivity of investment to cash flow, whereas both types of
fins that continued to rely on group banks showed much lower sensitivity
of investment to cash flow.24
To assess further the importance of this problem, we sorted the
sampleon the basis of whether investment in the post-deregulation period
was above or belowaverage. In general, this selection nile will be
problematicsince itimplicitly sorts on the basis of the residuals in
investmentequation. But in this case, it is perhaps the cLeanest way to
test whether performance or strength of affiliation is more important in
determining the investment/cash flow linkages. We found that the high
investment firms that maintained their group ties showed no significant
relation between investment and cash flow, while the high investment
firms that moved away showed a very strong and significant relation. The
lowinvestment firmsshoweda similar pattern although here the strongly
attachedgroup firms actually had a significantly negative cash flow
coefficient, while the fins that loosened their ties had a positive and
significant coefficient. Hence, group attachment and not stock market
indicators such as q or even realized investment rates seem to be the key
determinant of whether cash flow helps to predict investment.
Of course, q and observed investment rates are imperfect measures of
a firm's prospects. It is conceivable that a firm's financing patterns
are in fact better indicators. For example, it may be that only firms
with excellent investment opportunities reduce their bank ties so that
for them liquidity is particularly informative about investment
opportunities. Unfortunately, it is impossible determine whether the
financing behavior itself is a better measure of future performance.
Thus, to accept our interpretation of the facts one must believe that q
and investment rates themselves are reasonable measures of future
performance.25
4. Conclusion
Thispaper presents evidence on the rol.e of banks in monitoring
firms. We argued that bank monitoring mitigates information problems in
the capital market. This is manifested in the investment behavior of
fins with close bank relationships; these fins do not appear to be
liquidity constrained. We started with a sample of firms with close bank
ties and showed that their investment was not sensitive to their
liquidity.Regulatory reforms created new possibilities to raise money
directly from the capital market. We found that the investment of firms
thatchose this new financing option and weakened their bank ties was
much more sensitive to liquidity than firms that continued to borrow
heavily from banks.
Thisanalysis raises an obvious question:If indeed bankmonitoring
overcomes information problems and relaxes liquidity constraints, why did
some firms weaken their bank ties? This question points to the need for
a theory of the choice between bank debt and public debt. Except for
Diamond's (1989) recent theoretical contribution we know very little
about this tradeoff. Diamond argues that young firmsor older onesthat
have done poorly will borrow mainly from banks and older, more successful
firms will usepublicdebt. The idea is that successful firms have more
"reputation capital" at stake and hence have more to lose by taking
inefficient actions. These firms do not need to incur the monitoring
costs associated with bank borrowing. By contrast, younger firms have
not yet developed a reputation and older, less successful firms do not
have a good reputation to lose. It is therefore efficient for these
firmstoincur the costs of bank monitoring.26
Theresults presented here suggest that monitoring and other costs
associated with bank financing must be large. Otherwise, firms would not
have chosen to weaken their bank relationships until they had enough
collateral (both tangible and intangible) to be able to get around
liquidity constraints.Unfortunately, we can only conjecture what these
costs might be. Beyond direct monitoring costs, three others come to
mind.Thefirst obvious cost stems from regulations requiring banks to
hold a fraction of their assets in non-interest bearing assets. This
reserve requirement means that the costs of funds to banks exceed those
of individual investors; as a result, they will require a higher gross
rate of return on their investments.18 In addition, bank loans are
generally less liquid than publicly traded debt. The difficulty that
banks face in adjusting their loan portfolio may also mean that they will
requirea higher gross return.
Finally, a more subtle cost of bank financing may arise from the
different objectives of banks, corporatemanagers, andshareholders.
Since banks mainly hold debt claims, they receive littleof the upside
fromunusually good firm performance. (Of course, to the extent that
they ownequity they will participate in some of the gains.)
Shareholders, in contrast, care only about maximizing the upside. This
conflict may result in excessively conservative investment policies if
banks control corporate investment decisions. It may therefore be
efficient to reduce bank ties to avoid this problem at the expense of
becoming more liquidity constrained. As firms generate more cash from on-
going operations, they may be more willing to make this transition. In
addition, managers may prefer to have more control over operating
decisions than a bank is willing allow. Managers may choose to weaken27
the firms' bank ties and incur greater financing costs because it gives
them more control despite the fact that it is inefficient to do so. Again
as firms become more liquid, managers may be more willing to incur these
costs.
We conclude by emphasizing that this empirical analysis (and
MacKie-Mason's in this volume) as well as the theoretical work of
Diau'ond (1999) suggests that there is more to financing decisions than
the choice of a debt-equity ratio. A crucial decision that fins face is
the actual source of financing regardless of whether it is in the form of
debt or equity. The recent changes in Japanese financing arrangements
were particularly useful in addressing this issue.
Obviously, Japan is not the only country in which this issue is
important: firms operating in the context of other financial systems
face the very same set of questions. And, Japan's is not the only
financial system in the midst of rapid change. Along with the increase
in leverage in the U.S. there have been dramatic changes in who holds
corporate debt and equity. Firms are increasingly relying on private
equity markets for their financing; for many firms much of the equity is
held by management and large institutional investors. This movement away
from passive shareholders with small equity stakes to larger, more active
shareholdersmayhave important consequences for the link between the
financial andreal sides of the firm. In addition, there have been
strikingchanges in the structure of debt markets: junk bonds and the
increased reliance on private placement are two recent phenomena. While
firms in Japan have moved towards direct capital-market financing, in
some ways the move in the U.S. has been in the opposite direction.28
Understanding the forces underlying these changes is one of the important
challenges facing students of corporate finance.29
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Endootes
1. The costs include administrative expenses in excess of underwriting
fees, reserve requirements which raise the cost of funds to banks, and
the illiquidity of bank loans.
2. See, for example, Ramada and Horiuchi (1987), Royama (1982), Suzuki
(1974).
3. According to Shinkal (1988) these rates are said to "respect' the
market rates."
4. The government can still intervene to block an issue, but such
interventions are very unusual.
5. To simplify the calculations, we restricted the sample to firms with
accounting years ending in March. After imposing this restriction and
removing outliers, we are left with 337 firms- Most of the data on them
comes from the Nikkei Financial Data Tapes.
6. The dates here refer to the end of a fiscal year, so that when we say
1917 it refers to March 1977.
7. Our measure of Tobin's q is the ratio of the market value of debt and
equity (correcting for taxes) to the replacement cost (measured at market
values) of all assets. The construction of q is discussed at length in
Floshi and Kashyap (1987).
3. Throughout this section, we compare the median value for the firms at
two points in time. Even though the median firm is generally different
at each point, for ease of exposition we discuss the comparison as if the
same firm is being studied.
.See,for example, Hodder and Tschoegl (1985).34
10.In boththese ratios,thedenominatorsare nominal market-value
numbers while the numerator is a nominal book-value number. Given that
most bank borrowing is short term, the book-value numbers for borrowing
shouldnot be very different from the market-value numbers for borrowing.
Hence these ratios should be straightforward to interpret.
11. Note that we use the debt normalization rather than the asset
normalization. We do this because the asset-based measure is low for
high-asset firms so that one would expect to observe these patterns by
the very nature of the construction.
12. In calculating Tobin's q one must make numerous assumptions that no
doubt introduce measurement error. For example, one must convert book
value measure of asset values into market value measures, a very
imprecise task.
13. They argue that firms with low dividend-payouts are more likely to
face information problems since they seem to prefer retaining their
earnings.
14. since the length of the panel is so short, it is difficult to make
any further corrections for possible serial correlation.
15. End-of-period q is endogenous since it includes the end-of-period
replacement cost in its denominator which in turn includes the
replacement cost for investment made during the year. Accordingly, the
coefficient associated with end-of-period q will be biased towards zero.
16. It is not clear if dividends are discretionary and whether they
belong in a measure of liquidity; however, when we estimate our model
including dividends in our liquidity measure, our results do not change.35
17. The qs that appear in the regressions pertain only to depreciable
assets, that it is they are constructing by subtracting the replacement
cost of non-depreciable assets from the market value of the firm and
dividing this difference by the replacement cost of depreciable assets.
This measure of q and Tobin's q which is based on all assets are very
highly correlated. (see Iloshi and Kashyap (1987).)
18. Fama (1985) and James (1987) document an interesting fact along
these lines. They show that yields on bank certificates of deposit and
bankers'acceptances are no different than the yield on comparable
maturity government bonds and commercial paper. Thus, given reserve
requirements and their greater costs of funds they must be losing money
onthese securities and earning profits on their other activities,
perhaps corporate-lending activities. To be earning profits in this
activity they must offer a differentiated product: borrowing from a bank
must be different from borrowing directly from the capita]. market, Of
course, this fact does not tell us in what way the two sources of funds
are different.Table 2.1
composition of External Funds Raised by Manufacturing Fins (%)
1971—75 1976—80 1981—85























Other Borrowings 4.4 5.4 5.2
* Thedata are taken from Table 3—10 in Masahiko Nasu (1987).
Gendai Nihon no Kin—vu Kozo. p. 85.Table 2.2



























Real Capital Stock- -Depreciable Assets
(measured in millions of 1981 Yen)
Tobin's Q(forall assets)
Investment (Real Depreciable Assets)
Capital
Market Value of Debt











Nominal Market Valueof Total Debt
Nominal Book Value of Bonds
Nominal BookValueof Bank Borrowing




All Long-Ten LiabilitiesTable 2.3
Characteristics Sorted by Movements in Group Borrowing
to Total Debt Ratio
The 69 firms The 40 firms
where borrowing where borrowing
fro. Grout fell frog Grout ro
Total. Debt Total Debt
Medians Only Medians Only
1211 12li 2111
Real Capital Stock- -Depreciable Assets 10877 20674 15123 16115
Tobin's Q (for all assets) 1.34 1.74 1.24 1.46
Invesent(RealDepreciable Assets) .07 .19 .04 .15
Capital
Borrowing from Grout .28 .17 .25 .31
TotalDebt





Nominal Market Value of Total Debt 16531 17118 24671 20243
(63378) (81061) (67766) (71080)
Nominal Book Value of Bonds 1166 7162 286 0
(7730) (21470) (5596) (8481)
Nominal Book Value of Group Borrowing 4934 2967 5438 7736
(14265) (13527) (12890) (16308)table 3.1
Investmentand Internal Funds
Before and After Deregulation1
All 109 Fins All 109 Firms
































1Dependent variable is I/K. All regressions include a set of
yearlydunmies and are done using first—differenced data. The
standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates and
they have been corrected for the moving average introduced
by the first differencing.Table 3.2
Investment and Internal Funds
Before and After Deregulation
(controllingfor Movements in "Group Borrowing to Total Debts
Ratio")
GB/U downGB/D up GB/D downGB/U up
69Firms40 Firms69 Firms 40 Fins




















































tDependent variable is I/K. All regressions include a set of
yearly dummiesandare done using first-differenced data. The
standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates and
they have been corrected for the moving average introduced by the
first differencing.Table 3.3
Investment and Internal Funds Before and1After Deregulation
(Separating High and LowqFirms)
34 Firms 75 Firms34 Fins 75Firms
q1.5 in 1977 qcl.5in'77 q4.5 in '77 qc1.5in'77



















































tDependent variable is I/K. All regressions include a set
of yearly dummies and are doneusingfirst—differenced data. The
standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates and they
havebeen correctedfor the moving avenge introduced by the first
differencing.